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ENVIRONMENTAL INJUSTICE IN PORT ARTHUR, TEXAS
Victoria R. Danta
I. INTRODUCTION
To date, environmental protection policy and the courts that
enforce it have been almost exclusively concerned with two basic
issues: (1) what is an acceptable level of pollution; and (2) what kinds
of legal rules are best suited for reducing pollution to that level?' By
contrast, legislators have paid much less attention to the distributional
effects of environmental protection policy, including the potential for
distributional inequities. 2 While for most people in the United States,
the threat of being exposed to hazardous wastes or harmful chemical
agents is not an everyday concern, many low-income communities
and communities of color live in fear of inhaling, ingesting or
otherwise consuming potentially lethal chemical agents. 3
Accordingly, some have described modern environmentalism as
"'irrelevant' at best and, at worst, 'a deliberate attempt by a bigoted
and selfish white middle-class society to perpetuate its own values
and protect its own life style at the expense of the poor and the
underprivileged."' 4  They forcefully contend that existing
1. Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing "Environmental Justice": The Distributional
Effects of Environmental Protection, 87 Nw. U. L. REV. 787, 787 (1993).
2. Id.; see also Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap
Between Environmental Laws and "Justice," 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 260 (1997).
3. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 788.
4. Id. (quoting James N. Smith, The Coming of Age of Environmentalism in
American Society, in ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IN URBAN
AMERICA 1 (James N. Smith ed., 1974)).
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environmental protection policy inadequately reflects minority
political interests and perpetuates institutional racism.5
Gradually, these prominent voices formed what today is known as
the environmental justice movement.6 Environmental justice is the
"fair treatment and meaningful involvement of all people regardless
of race, color, national origin, or income with respect to the
development, implementation and enforcement of environmental
laws, regulations and policies."7 It is also the equal distribution of
environmental benefits and burdens within society; the ability of low-
income communities and communities of color to speak for
themselves; and the "development of a national and international
movement of all peoples of color to fight the destruction and taking
of their lands and communities."8
Unfortunately, what few legal tools exist to achieve these goals are
frequently applied in frustration of environmental justice.9  For
example, many federal actions that disparately impact low-income
communities and communities of color are not subject to judicial
review.10 Accordingly, they are not redressable through any forum
5. Kaswan, supra note 2, at 258 (noting that minorities were excluded from
some of the parks and public beaches created at the behest of environmentalists,
and that some environmental groups excluded minorities from membership); see
also Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806-11 (suggesting that environmental and land use
laws have provided more environmental benefits to the white and the affluent while
providing fewer benefits to or worsening the environmental conditions of the poor
and communities of color).
6. National Resources Defense Counsel, The Environmental Justice
Movement, http://www.nrdc.org/ej/history/hej2.asp (last visited April 25, 2010).
7. EPA, OFFICE OF FED. ACTIVITIES, "FINAL GUIDANCE FOR CONSIDERATION
OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN CLEAN AIR ACT 309 REVIEwS (1999), available at
http://www.epa.gov/compliance/resources/policies/nepa/enviro-justice_309review.
pdf.
8. DELEGATES TO THE FIRST NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL
LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, THE PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE (EJ) (1991),
available at http://www.ejnet.org/ej/principles.pdf.
9. Lazarus, supra note 1, at 806-11.
10. For example, under the National Environmental Policy Act, a court can only
set aside a federal agency's decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact
Statement on a showing that the agency's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law." Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006); see also North Carolina v. FAA, 957
F.2d 1125, 1131 (4th Cir. 1992) ("An agency's refusal to prepare an environmental
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other than those provided by federal administrative agencies."
Additionally, some of the most powerful legal tools for achieving
environmental justice require public and private actors to analyze the
impact of their proposed actions, but do not impose any substantive
requirement to avoid actions with adverse environmental,
socioeconomic, cultural or health impacts.12 Finally, even legal tools
that, by their terms, allow environmental justice communities to
speak for themselves do not ensure that all members of the affected
public actually participate in the environmental review process.
In May 2007, residents of Port Arthur, Texas, became unwitting
victims in this struggle when they sought to enjoin the U.S. Army
from transporting a potentially lethal VX nerve agent derivative
("CVXH") from a chemical weapons storage depot in Newport,
Indiana, to Veolia Environmental Services, in Port Arthur.14
Unbeknownst to Port Arthur residents, the Army determined to
incinerate CVXH within their community after a protracted and
opaque decision-making process.' 5 In Sierra Club v. Gates, plaintiffs
argued that the Army illegally excluded them from the notice-and-
comment procedures required by the National Environmental Policy
Act ("NEPA").16  They also argued that the Army violated NEPA
when it failed to complete an environmental risk assessment for the
incineration project at Veolia.' 7  However, when the case came
before the District Court for the Southern District of Indiana, the
Court held on the record that Plaintiffs were unable to prove a
impact statement is arbitrary and capricious if its action might have a significant
environmental impact.").
11. See sources cited supra note 10.
12. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350-51 (1989)
("NEPA itself does not mandate particular results, but simply prescribes the
necessary process. . . . Other statutes may impose substantive environmental
obligations on federal agencies, but NEPA merely prohibits uninformed-rather
than unwise-agency action." (citations omitted)).
13. Peter L. Reich, Greening the Ghetto: A Theory of Environmental Race
Discrimination, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 271, 277-78 (1992) (citing Paul Mohai, Black
Environmentalism, 71 Soc. Sci. Q. 744, 762 (1990) (examining the barrier against
meaningful public participation created by the technical nature of environmental
policy discussions)).
14. Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 1126.
17. Id.
2 01 0] VX IN TX 4 17
418 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW
likelihood of success on the merits.' 8  Accordingly, it dismissed
Plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction without reaching the
questions whether Plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm, or
whether Plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law.19 In an order
dated August 8, 2008, the same Court granted the Government's
Motion to Limit Judicial Review of Plaintiffs' NEPA allegations to
the administrative record and permitted the Government to file an
oversized brief to summarize the administrative record in response to
Plaintiffs' Statement of Material Facts.20 As a result, CVXH
incineration continues in Port Arthur to this day.2 1
The following comment summarizes the District Court's opinion
denying plaintiffs' Motion for Preliminary Injunction, identifies the
environmental justice issues raised in Sierra Club v. Gates, and
considers how the current legal infrastructure is inadequate to remedy
environmental injustice.
In Part II, I deliver a brief history of the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile and detail the ways in which the U.S. chemical weapons
stockpile poses a threat to human health and the environment. I also
review the legal authority demanding destruction of the U.S.
chemical weapons stockpile, including NEPA's procedural
requirement that federal agencies issue an environmental impact
statement for all major federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment.
Part III catalogs the Army's decision to incinerate the U.S.
chemical weapons stockpile and, later, to neutralize the stockpile
using chemical processes. It also travels the rocky road to Port
Arthur, TX, and enumerates the specific challenges to environmental
justice that Port Arthur residents faced.
Finally, Part IV introduces the Sierra Club plaintiffs' legal claims
and analyzes the District Court's opinion denying Plaintiffs' Motion
for a Preliminary Injunction.
The comment concludes by suggesting ways prospective plaintiffs
can adapt to and avoid outcomes like Sierra Club v. Gates.
18. Id. at 1136.
19. Id.
20. Sierra Club v. Gates, 2008 WL 4368531, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 22, 2008).
21. Incineration is ongoing as of May 7, 2009.
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II. CHEMICAL WEAPONS
A. A BrieffHistory of the U.S. Chemical Weapons Stockpile
The United States developed its chemical weapons stockpile in
response to the threat posed by Germany during World War I.22 By
1995, the American arsenal consisted of approximately 30,000 tons
of chemical weapons,23 stored at eight different locations throughout
the U.S.24 The majority of these weapons would be useless in a
25
military attack. Nevertheless, they have been in storage since
chemical weapons production ceased in 1968.26
As the following paragraphs show, there are good reasons why the
U.S. spends approximately $63.8 million a year to monitor and
inspect the stockpiles.27 While there have been no serious incidents
or accidents at any of the eight storage facilities to date,28 the U.S.
chemical weapons stockpile contains agents that are far more lethal
than the chemical released in Bhopal, India, in 1984, which caused
25,000 deaths. 29 In fact, much of this stockpile is a military liability
22. Germany first used poison gas in World War I during the Second Battle of
Ypres. Two French divisions collapsed after being subjected to a German attack
using chlorine gas. See Charles E. Heller, Chemical Warfare in World War I: The
American Experience, 1917-1918, at 1, 8-10 (Combat Studies Institute,
Leavenworth Papers No. 10 LEAVENWORTH PAPERS, 1984), available at
http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/chemical/chem-ptl.pdf.
23. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 935 F.
Supp. 1206, 1209 (D. Utah 1996).
24. Lawrence E. Rouse, The Disposition of the Current Stockpile of Chemical
Munitions and Agents, 121 MIL. L. REV. 17, 18 (1988).
25. As of 1985, the United States chemical stockpile provided only a marginal
deterrent capability. CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION, REPORT OF THE
CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION 58 (1985). This was attributed largely
to the age, design and unpredictability of individual weapons. Id. The U.S. Army
Toxic and Hazardous Materials Agency has since reported that the retaliatory
capability of the 1985 stockpile is ten percent useful, eighteen percent of limited
use, eleven percent of no use and sixty one percent not in useful form. Rouse, supra
note 24, at 17-18.
26. Rouse, supra note 24, at 18.
27. CHEMICAL WARFARE REVIEW COMMISSION, supra note 25. Note that the
cost of continuously monitoring and inspecting the stockpiles has most likely risen
since this report was issued in 1985.
28. Rouse, supra note 24, at 18 (citing National Research Council, Disposal of
Chemical Munitions and Agents: A Report, at 30 (1984)).
29. Id. (citing Chemical Warfare Review Commission, supra note 25).
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rather than an asset, due to age, uncertain toxicity and design
unsuitability.3 0
B. Chemical Agents in the Stockpile
The U.S. chemical weapons stockpile contains two major
categories of agents: nerve agents (designated GA or Tabun, GB or
Sarin, and VX), which are odorless, colorless and tasteless
organophosphorus esters that attack the human nervous system
directly in both liquid and vapor forms; ' and vesicant or blister
agents (designated H, HD, and HT), which cause damage to exposed
skin or through inhalation. 32 Exposure to any of these agents can
cause: skin bums; temporary and permanent blindness; shortness of
breath; pinpoint pupils; increased salivation; abnormal tearing of the
eyes; nausea and vomiting; involuntary defecation and urination;
seizures; paralysis; coma; and death by asphyxiation. 33
Additionally, studies have proven that blister agents are
carcinogens and that exposed men suffer from abnormal sperm
counts. 34 The chemical agents in the stockpile are housed in a broad
range of rockets, bombs, mines and projectiles, most of which are
stored in covered igloos. 35  Many of these weapons are at least
30. Or according to one legal scholar, "a diverse and far-flung witch's brew of
lethality." David A. Koplow, How Do We Get Rid of These Things?: Dismantling
Excess Weapons While Protecting the Environment, 89 NW. U.L. REV. 445, 472
(1995).
31. Rouse, supra note 24, at 19.
32. Id.
33. Id.; see also Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs
for Nerve Agents, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfactsl66.html (last visited Apr. 18,
2009) (discussing the risks associated with nerve agents, including possible sources
of exposure and related health effects).
34. See Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, ToxFAQs for
Sulfur Mustard, http://www.atsdr.cdc.gov/tfacts49.html (last visited Apr. 18, 2009)
(discussing the risks associated with mustard gas, including possible sources of
exposure and related health effects).
35. Including 4.2 inch mortar projectiles containing mustard agent, 105
millimeter artillery projectiles containing mustard and nerve agents GB and VX,
bombs of 500, 600 and 750 pounds containing nerve agent GB, and aerial spray
tanks containing nerve agent VX. Rouse, supra note 24, at 18.
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twenty-five to forty years old,36 and all of them have retained their
lethality.37
Fortunately, a Congressional act, an international treaty, and a
Presidential declaration have all directed the Army to destroy the
existing chemical weapons stockpile.38  As a result, the Army has
committed to disposing of its chemical weapons stockpile by
December 31, 2017.39
C. Legal Authority Demanding Destruction
The Army's task is difficult but necessary. In 1986, Congress
passed the Department of Defense Authorization Act, which required
the Secretary of Defense to destroy all of the chemical weapons being
stored throughout the country.40 To satisfy the requirements of this
Act, the Army must destroy all chemical weapons and agents, while
providing:
(1) maximum protection for the environment, the general
public, and the personnel who are involved in the
destruction process;
(2) adequate and safe facilities designed solely for the
destruction of the chemical agents; and
(3) cleanup, dismantling, and disposal of the facilities when the
disposal program is complete. 4 1
36. Rouse, supra note 24, at 18.
37. Inspections of chemical weapons have proven that these resilient chemicals
possess a remarkably long shelf life. Id. at 17-22.
38. See, e.g., Dept. of Def. Authorization Act of 1986, 50 U.S.C. § 1521 (2000);
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and
Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974 U.N.T.S.
316; President Bush, Statement on Chemical Weapons, I PUB. PAPERS 599 (May
13, 1991).
39. Ashlee Clark, "Depot Weapons Disposal Delayed, LEXINGTON HERALD-
LEADER, Nov. 25, 2008," available at http://www.cwwg.org/hlll.25.08.html (last
visited Apr. 18, 2009). Initially, the deadline set by Congress was September 30,
1994; following that, the Congress extended the deadline first to December 31,
2004, and then to December 31, 2007. Families Concerned about Nerve Gas
Incineration v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, No. CV-02-BE-2822-E, at 2 (N.D. Ala.
July 8, 2003) (mem. of op.), available at http://www.cwwg.org/ALorder.pdf.
40. 50 U.S.C. § 1521(a).
41. 50 U.S.C. § 1521(c)(1).
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There are two exceptions to this mandate. First, the Secretary of
Defense may defer the destruction of certain chemical agents and
munitions in the event of war, a national emergency, 4 2 or if he or she
determines that there has been a significant delay in the destruction
process.43 Second, the statutory date by which all weapons shall be
destroyed may be altered to conform to the date determined by any
treaty the U.S. ratifies banning possession of chemical agents and
munitions.4
The Army is also under pressure from the International Convention
on Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling, and Use
45
of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction, which bans the use
of chemical weapons and requires signatory states to destroy their
existing chemical weapons and chemical weapons productions
facilities by April 29, 2007.46
Finally, in 1991, President George H. W. Bush issued a
declaration, "foreswearing the use of chemical weapons for any
reason, including retaliation, against any state, effective when [the
CWC] enters into force[.]" 4 7
Destruction of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile is also subject
to the procedural requirements 48 of NEPA, which:
declare[s] a national policy which will encourage
productive and enjoyable harmony between man and his
environment; ... promote[s] efforts which will prevent or
eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere and
42. As declared by the President or Congress. 50 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
43. 50 U.S.C. § 1521(b)(3)(A) (2000).
44. 50 U.S.C. § 1521(b)(2).
45. Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction, Jan. 13, 1993, 1974
U.N.T.S. 316, available at http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-
convention/download-the-cwc.
46. See Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, Destruction of
Chemical Weapons, http://www.opcw.org/chemical-weapons-convention/about-
the-convention (last visited Apr. 18, 2009).
47. President Bush, Statement on Chemical Weapons, 1 PUB. PAPERs 599.
48. Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. United States Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1281,
1287 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that NEPA itself does not mandate particular
results, but simply prescribes necessary process).
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stimulate the health and welfare of man; [and enriches] the
understanding of the ecological systems and natural
resources important to the Nation[.] 4 9
When Congress passed NEPA in 1969, it had two major purposes:
(1) to build environmental considerations into the federal agency
decision-making process;o and (2) to provide meaningful
opportunity for public participation in the federal agency decision-
making process.5 ' Accordingly, NEPA ensures that federal agencies
will not act on incomplete information, only to regret their decision
later on.
To fulfill NEPA's requirements, a federal agency must prepare an
environmental impact statement (an "EIS") for all "major federal
actions', 52  sipificantly affecting the quality of the human
environment.s EISs must include the environmental impact of the
proposed action, as well as "all reasonable alternatives" to the
proposed action, including the alternative of "no action." 54 Once a
draft EIS is complete, the agency must solicit and respond to
comments from the public and other federal, state, or local
agencies. 5 In addition, agencies must "make diligent efforts to
involve the public" by way of notification, public disclosure of
comments and underlying documents, and public hearings or
56
meetings. The final EIS must include the agency's responses to
49. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
50. Boston v. Volpe, 464 F.2d 254 (1st Cir. 1972) (holding that NEPA also
requires agencies to consider any and all environmental consequences, as well as
additional environmental consequences not fully evaluated at outset of project or
program); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1970).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970).
52. Council on Environmental Quality, Environmental Impact Statement, 40
C.F.R. § 1502.4 (2009).
53. Id. § 1502.3.
54. See Weinberger v. Catholic Action of Haw., 454 U.S. 139, 142 (1981). The
alternatives section is the heart of the EIS. In it, agencies are directed to
"emphasize real environmental issues and alternatives," and to comparatively
assess those alternatives in an objective way. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.2(b), 1502.14(a)-
(b).
55. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.1.
56. Id. § 1506.6. Furthermore, EPA regulations require at least one public
meeting on all draft EISs. Id. at § 6.203(c)(3)(vi).
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comments and is followed by a Record of Decision selecting one of
the proposed alternatives. 57
The Council on Environmental Quality further provides for a
preliminary environmental assessment (an "EA") when the
significance of the environmental impact of an action is unclear.5 8
Agencies may also be required to prepare a supplemental
environmental impact statement (a "SEIS"), or a supplemental
environmental assessment (a "SEA") under NEPA. 59 According to
the Council for Environmental Quality, agencies should prepare
SEISs and SEAs whenever they uncover new information that is
relevant to the environmental effects of a proposed project, or when
substantial changes are made to an existing project that are relevant
60 6to its environmental impacts. This is a discretionary procedure, 6' in
which agencies apply a "rule of reason" to determine whether "new
information is sufficient to show that the remaining [major federal
action] will 'affect the quality of the human environment' in a
significant manner or to a significant extent not already
considered." 62  Thus, even after proposed projects receive agency
approval, agencies should continue to take a "hard look" at that
project's environmental consequences.6 3
Under the Administrative Procedure Act, courts are directed to
uphold an agency's decision whether or not to complete an EIS or
SEIS unless it is arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.64
Under this limited standard of review, the agency's decision will not
be set aside until a court considers all relevant factors and
independently concludes that there has been a "clear error of
judgment." 65
57. Id. §§ 1502.9, 1505.2.
58. Id. § 1501.3.
59. Id. §§ 1502.9(c)(1)(i)-(ii).
60. Id.
61. See Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989)
(holding that the Court must defer to the informed discretion of the agency because
analysis of the relevant evidence requires agency expertise).
62. Id. at 374 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2008)).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 377 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1971) (abrogated by statute on other grounds)).
65. Id. at 378.
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III. DESTRUCTION OF THE U.S. CHEMICAL WEAPONS STOCKPILE
Prompted by the dangers of continued storage and the legal
pressure to destroy the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile, the Army
began experimenting with means of destroying chemical weapons.
Initially, the United States contemplated some disposal methods that,
in retrospect, were "foolish, impractical, or environmentally
unacceptable." 66  For example, many weapons were buried in
ordinary public or military landfills with "shockingly poor
procedures" for posting hazard warnings or recording release
activity. 67 The Army burned others in open pits,68 or dumped them
off the Alaskan, Californian and Floridian coasts.6 9  It was even
thought possible to place chemical weapons in a large, solid cavern
and detonate a nuclear weapon, instantly vaporizing the remaining
chemical weapons stockpile. 70 (However, the Army rejected disposal
by nuclear explosion, due to the difficulty of determining an
acceptable site, obtaining necessary approvals, and overcoming
questionable public acceptance.) 71
In 1979, the Army constructed a Chemical Agents Munitions
Disposal pilot system in Tooele, Utah, to assess incineration as a
method of disposing chemical weapons. 72 Pursuant to NEPA, the
Army assessed the environmental impact of incinerating chemical
66. Koplow, supra note 30, at 515-16.
67. Id. at 515 (citing U.S. Army Chemical Materiel Destruction Agency,
Interim Survey & Analysis Report on Non-Stockpile Chemical Materiel Program
16 (1993)). But see Rouse, supra note 24, at 34 (explaining that, while colorful, it is
unfair to characterize the Army's procedure for posting hazard warnings or
recording release activity as "shockingly poor," because "until recently, monitoring
devices simply did not exist that could measure emissions at the extremely low
levels necessary to evaluate the destructive efficiency of various techniques").
68. See Graham S. Pearson & Richard S. Magee, Critical Evaluation of Proven
Chemical Weapon Destruction Technologies, 74 PuRE APPL. CHEM. 187, 194
(2002); see also Rouse, supra note 24, at 35 ("A 1979 open-pit burning of
'smokepots' . . . which are far less toxic than any agents in the inventory,
apparently caused some nearby residents to seek hospital treatment after inhaling
the fumes released").
69. See Pearson & Magee, supra note 68, at 199.
70. See Tariq Rauf, Cleaning Up with a Bang, THE BULLETIN OF ATOMIC
SCIENTISTS, Jan-Feb. 1992 at 9, 47.
7 1. Id.
72. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 935 F.
Supp. 1206, 1210 (D. Utah 1996); see also Rouse, supra note 24, at 18.
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weapons as compared with continued storage. 73  The Army
completed a Final Programmatic EIS in 1988, in which they decided
to use on-site incineration to destroy the chemical weapons.74 This
conclusion was based in part on the Army's considerable experience
with large-scale incineration of agent materials. By 1988, the
Chemical Agents Munitions Disposal pilot system had incinerated
75,000 pounds of GB, 8,000 pounds of VX, and 38,000 items of
munitions.7 5  The Army had also been operating an incineration
facility at Johnson Atoll for six years, during which time the Army
destroyed over 2,000,000 pounds of agent and over 9,000,000 pounds
of drained containers.76 Fortunately, operation of both facilities was
generally successful.77
A. Opposition to Incineration and the Army's Decision to Use
Other Disposal Methods
The Army's decision to use on-site incineration to dispose of the
chemical weapons stockpile was met with staunch opposition.
Opponents argued for alternative methods of disposal, claiming that
on-site incineration negatively affected human health and the
environment. 79  Specifically, they argued that incinerators create
toxic waste, like dioxins, which would then be released into the
environment.80
In 1996, Plaintiffs Chemical Weapons Working Group, the Sierra
Club, and the Vietnam Veterans of America Foundation filed suit
against the Army. They sought to enjoin the Army's proposed
operation of the Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility in Tooele,
Utah.81 Among Plaintiffs' claims were that the Army violated NEPA
when it:
73. Chemical Weapons, 935 F. Supp. at 1210.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 1209; see also Rouse, supra note 24, at 18.
76. Chemical Weapons, 935 F. Supp. at 1210.
77. Id.
78. ELIZABETH CROWE & MIKE SCHADE, LEARNING NOT TO BURN: A PRIMER
FOR CITIZENS ON ALTERNATIVES TO BURNING HAZARDOUS WASTE 3 (2002),
available at http://www.cwwg.org/leamingnottoburn.pdf
79. Id.
80. Chemical Weapons, 935 F. Supp at 1213 (acknowledging that the
incinerators create and release dioxins); CROWE & SCHADE, supra note 78, at 3.
81. Chemical Weapons, 935 F. Supp at 1213.
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(1) neglected to complete a SEIS taking into account new
information that had become available regarding the
incineration programs;82
(2) improperly assessed risks associated with dioxin exposure;
and
(3) failed to consider the recent development of alternative
disposal technologies.84
A hearing was held over several days from July 22 through August
2, 1996, after which the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction. Less than three weeks later, trial
incineration of chemical agents commenced at the Tooele Chemical
Agent Disposal Facility.86 During this time, the Army limited the
Tooele Chemical Agent Disposal Facility's operations to identifying
possible problems-a practice Plaintiffs decried as "trial-and-error"
88management. ' Plaintiffs initiated a second motion for preliminary
injunction on January 11, 1997.8 Together, these two motions for
preliminary injunctive relief were the only times that a court would
consider the merits of Plaintiffs' NEPA claims.
Nevertheless, the Army decided not to expand its chemical
weapons incineration program. Apparently, in 1994, Congress
earmarked additional federal funds for the Army to "aggressively
consider development of incineration alternatives." 89 By 2002, there
were four alternative technologies that could be used instead of
incineration at any of the eight storage sites: (1) neutralization and
biological treatment; (2) neutralization and supercritical water
oxidation; (3) neutralization, neutralization and supercritical water
oxidation, and gas phase chemical reduction; and (4) Silver II
electrochemical oxidation-all of which have proved successful. 90
82. Id. at 1208.
83. Id. at 1213.
84. Id. at 1214.
85. Id. at 1209.
86. Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of the Army, 963 F.
Supp. 1083, 1086 (D. Utah 1997).
87. Id. at 1086-1087.
88. Id. at 1086.
89. Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1106 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
90. CROWE & SCHADE, supra note 78, at 3.
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B. The Rocky Road to Port Arthur, Texas
After Congress appropriated additional funds for the Army to
aggressively consider development of alternatives to incineration, the
Government published a Final EIS in 1998 to pilot test a chemical
neutralization plan for VX at the chemical weapons depot in
Newport, Indiana. 9 1 As described by the 1998 Final EIS, the plan
was to neutralize VX at a Newport Chemical Agent Disposal Facility,
to be built adjacent to the chemical weapons depot in Newport,
Indiana. 9 2 Using caustic neutralization, the Army planned to subject
CVXH to supercritical water oxidation to eliminate remaining
organic compounds. 9 3 In February and April 1999, the Edgewood
Chemical Biological Center published two reports on the residual VX
concentration in various aspects of CVXH. 94 These reports, and
subsequent studies by the National Research Center, 95 confirmed the
presence of residual VX in CVXH, even after supercritical water
oxidation was performed. 96 Accordingly, the Army evaluated off-site
waste management of CVXH for cost and scheduling benefits, as a
contingency plan in case of startup problems with supercritical water
oxidation.97
In part in response to these studies, and in other part in response to
the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Army published a
Final EA and a Final Finding of No Significant Impact regarding the
VX destruction process proposed for the chemical weapons depot in
Newport, Indiana. 98  The Final EA compared a "no-action"
alternative to disposal of CVXH at an off-site treatment, storage and
disposal facility.99 At this time, the Army also stated that CVXH
would be scheduled as a "hazardous waste," unless the supercritical
water oxidation treatment option was employed. In the latter case,
any CVXH effluent would be delisted and classified as non-
hazardous. 100
91. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1104.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 1105.
96. Id.
97. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1105.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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It is worth noting that both the Final EA and the Final Finding of
No Significant Impact contained only cursory descriptions of the
general risk of traffic accidents in the transport of CVXH to an off-
site treatment, storage and disposal facility.101 Moreover, neither
document was site- or treatment-method specific, i.e., the documents
did not identify or analyze any particular location to which the
CVXH would be shipped and treated, or any particular method of
CVXH treatment that would be used. 102 While the Army recognized
that some human or environmental impacts that would be avoided or
reduced at the chemical weapons depot in Newport, Indiana, could be
transferred to the locality of some yet to be selected off-site
treatment, storage and disposal facility, the Army made clear that103
individual evaluations were beyond the documents' scope.
Nevertheless, between October 2002 and April 2007, the Army
materially relied on the documents during its decision-making
process.104
Later, the Army refined several aspects of their disposal plan,
including discussing the potential impacts to the human population
and environmental resources of CVXH transportation along two
routes from the chemical weapons depot in Newport, Indiana, to a
treatment, storage and disposal facility in Stillwater, New Jersey. os
The resulting Transportation Analysis included a characterization of
CVXH, with a comparison of the wastewater to the Indiana
Department of Environmental Management's standard for the
maximum allowable VX concentration level.106 The Transportation
Analysis, like the Final EA and Final Finding of No Significant
Impact, assumed that there would not be detectable amounts of VX in
the CVXH.10 7 Additionally, the Transportation Analysis:
101. Complaint at 27, Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (S.D. Ind.
2007).
102. Id.
103. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Complaint, supra note 101, at 28.
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(1) identified the Stillwater facility as a treatment, storage and
disposal facility capable of treating and disposing of the
CVXH load; '08
(2) established an "upper bound" on the distances and travel
times that would be needed during the off-site shipping
campaign; 109 and
(3) analyzed the environmental impacts for two different routes
from Newport, Indiana, to the Stillwater, New Jersey.1 10
However, the transportation analysis left open the possibility that
the Army would select another facility that would pass near fewer
people and fewer environmental resources."ll
On May 18, 2007, the Army first disclosed in the public portion of
the administrative record that it planned to ship CVXH from the
chemical weapons depot in Newport, Indiana, to a treatment, storage
and disposal facility in Port Arthur, Texas (Veolia).11 2  The plan
specifically identified a single route from Newport, Indiana, to Port
Arthur, Texas, and enumerated specific dangers to land, air and water
if an accident were to occur during transit.113 However, no new
ecological risk assessment was performed by the Army or Veolia
Environmental Services at that time, and no such assessment was
reviewed by the EPA.11 4 In fact, most citizens of Port Arthur learned
of this project in a local press release synchronized with the departure
of the first CVXH convoy for Veolia's incinerator.1 1 5
IV. SIERRA CLUB V. GATES
In response to these developments, the Sierra Club; the Chemical
Weapons Working Group; Citizens Against Incineration at Newport;
108. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1106.
109. Id. at 1106-07.
110. Id. at 1107.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1135.
113. Id.
114. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1135.
115. American Public Health Association, Selected New Publications on
Environmental Public Health and Environmental Justice Topics,
http://www.apha.org/membergroups/newsletters/sectionnewsletters/environ/spring0
7/publications.htm (last visited Apr. 25, 2009).
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Community In-Power Development Association; Sara Morgan;
Leonard Akers; Hilton Kelley; Moya Green; and Anisha Swallow
(collectively, the "Plaintiffs") sought a Motion for Preliminary
Injunction to enjoin Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates, Secretary
of the Army Pete Green, the U.S. Department of Defense and the
U.S. Department of the Army (collectively, the "Government"); and
Veolia Environmental Services Inc. ("Veolia") from (1) "continuing
shipments of CVXH from the chemical weapons depot in Newport,
Indiana, to Veolia's incineration facility in Port Arthur, Texas;"11 6
and (2) "incinerating CVXH in Port Arthur, Texas."" 7
Plaintiffs argued that the Government was required to prepare a
site-specific SEA or SEIS to assess the incineration program's effects
on human health and the environment in Port Arthur." 8
Furthermore, Plaintiffs accused the Government of failing to comply
with the NEPA requirement that there be an opportunity for public
review and comment on the specific action proposed and selected,
including the ultimate receiving location for CVXH and actual
treatment method to be used. 119
When Plaintiffs filed their Motion for a Preliminary Injunction,120
they were between a rock and an especially hard place: in addition to
being cognizant of the substantive threats CVXH transportation and
incineration posed to human health and the environment, Plaintiffs
were victims in a classic environmental justice struggle over
information, participation and equal treatment. They seized on
NEPA's broad scope and procedural requirements to eliminate
information asymmetry, encourage public participation, and reduce
the likelihood of any further disparate impacts 12' -only to find that
116. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03; Complaint, supra note 101, at 58-
59.
117. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1102-03; Complaint, supra note 101, at 58-
59.
118. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1101-02.
119. Id. Plaintiffs also asserted claims under the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (RCRA), the Defense Authorization Act (DAA) and Indiana and
Texas state law against all Defendants. However, claims under NEPA against the
Government formed the backbone of Plaintiffs' complaint and, therefore, are the
primary focus of this note.
120. Id. at 1101.
121. Id. at 1102-03.
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the Court was unwilling to consider the bulk of their legal claims.122
Determining on the record that Plaintiffs failed to show a likelihood
of success on the merits,123 the court denied Plaintiffs' motion for a
preliminary injunction and allowed CVXH incineration to proceed.124
A. Summary of the District Court's Opinion Denying Plaintiffs'
Motion for a Preliminary Injunction
It is certainly worth noting, as the Court did, that a preliminary
injunction is an extraordinary remedy that will only issue on a clear
showing of need.125 To obtain a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs
have the burden to show (1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2)
irreparable harm if the injunction is denied; and (3) the inadequacy of
any remedy at law.1 26 Even if plaintiffs make this threshold showing,
a reviewing court must also balance the hardship on plaintiffs if the
injunction is wrongfully denied against the hardship on defendants if
it is wrongfully granted. 127  Accordingly, obtaining a preliminary
injunction is a significant obstacle on any set of facts.
Plaintiffs' alleged environmental injustice in each of the following
ways: (1) unequal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens
in an environmental justice community; 128 and (2) restriction on an
environmental justice community's ability to speak for itself.129
Specifically, Plaintiffs contended that Port Arthur residents were
already exposed to a variety of potentially dangerous industrial
pollutants and, as a low-income community and a community of
color, qualified as an environmental justice community for which
special protections were required.130  They also argued that the
Government violated their rights as U.S. citizens when it denied them
the opportunity, from July 2002 to May 2007, to review, supplement,
or submit comments on the administrative record, or to engage in
122. Id. at 1101-02.
123. Id. at 1136.
124. Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1136.
125. See Cooper v. Salazar, 196 F.3d 809, 813 (7th Cir. 1999) (citing Mazurek v
Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 (1997)).
126. See Ty, Inc. v. Jones Group Inc., 237 F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2001).
127. Id.
128. Complaint, supra note 101, at 41-45.
129. Id. at 58-59.
130. Id. at 41-45.
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political behavior that could otherwise have influenced the decision-
making process.' 3 '
The court divided these allegations into two parts: (1) that the
government failed to assess properly the environmental impact of
production process incidents and/or process changes at the Newport,
Indiana, facility; and (2) that the Government failed to asses properly
the environmental impact of its decision to transport CVXH from
Newport, Indiana, to Port Arthur, Texas, and to incinerate CVXH at
Veolia.132  Accordingly, the court translated, NEPA obliged the
Government to prepare a site- and treatment-specific SEA or SEIS
for its waste management operations in Port Arthur, Texas.133 in
general, the Government contended that (1) it properly assessed the
environmental impact of production process incidents and/or process
changes at the Newport, Indiana, facility; and (2) that it properly
characterized CVXH as a caustic hazardous waste for which a NEPA
analysis is not required. 134
Thereafter, the court stated the law relevant to Plaintiffs' NEPA
allegations. First, it acknowledged that NEPA "is designed to
prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and the biosphere by
focusing Government and public attention on the environmental
effects of proposed agency action."1 3 5 Second, it noted that NEPA
ordinarily requires that an agency disseminate information about its
proposed action such that the public and other government agencies
may react to the effects of the proposed action in a meaningful time
frame.136 Finally, it explained that there are actions that are
categorically excluded from ordinary NEPA analysis, including
certain of the Army's hazardous materials/hazardous waste
management operations.' 37 Thus, when the Army scheduled CVXH
as a caustic hazardous waste, it placed CVXH waste management
131. Id. at 23-32, 41-45.
132. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1126-27.
133. Id. at 1127.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Specifically, "routine management, to include transportation, distribution,
use, storage, treatment, and disposal of solid waste, medical waste, radiological and
special hazards. . . and/or hazardous waste that complies with EPA, Army or other
regulatory agency requirements." 32 C.F.R. § 651.28(h)(4).
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operations within the realm of Army actions for which EISs are not
required. 38
Next, the court set forth the scope of judicial review for agency
action under the Administrative Procedure Act. In essence, the Court
asked only whether the decision was based on consideration of the
relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of
judgment.13 9  Furthermore, the Court gave deference to the
Government's factual findings when it decides whether or not the
environmental impacts of its actions are significant. The Seventh
Circuit has stated that "[t]he only role for a court in applying the
arbitrary and capricious standard in the NEPA context is to '[e]nsure
that the agency has taken a "hard look" at environmental
consequences."'
40
Finally, the court applied these standards to each of Plaintiffs'
NEPA allegations. With respect to Plaintiffs' argument that the
Government violated NEPA when it failed to assess properly the
environmental impact of new information revealed from process
incidents and/or from process changes at the chemical weapons depot
in Newport, Indiana, the Court concluded that:
(1) "the Army properly considered all the available evidence
when it concluded that CVXH safely could be classified as
a caustic hazardous waste" 4 1;
(2) "that the Government took the necessary 'hard look' when
it decided that process incidents "posed no new significant
threat" 4 2 to human health or the environment; and
(3) "that the Government's decision not to supplement its
earlier [Final EA and Final Finding of No Significant
Impact]... because of [] process change[s] was not
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious." 4 3
138. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1127.
139. Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378 (1989).
140. Highway J Citizens Group v. Mineta, 349 F.3d 938, 953 (7th Cir. 2003)
(quoting Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n. 21 (1976)).
141. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1130.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1131.
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Thereafter, the court addressed Plaintiffs' argument that the
Government unreasonably proceeded with shipments of CVXH from
the chemical weapons depot in Newport, Indiana, to Veolia without
performing an EA or an EIS. While the court agreed with Plaintiffs
that "the most troubling aspect of the Government's decision with
respect to shipment of CVXH to Veolia for incineration [was] the
apparently short time in which the Government made this decision
and the lack of transparency to the public in the decision-making
process,"l44 it concluded that the Government's environmental
assessment process was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.14 5
The Final EA (1) affirmatively disclosed that CVXH would be
classified as a hazardous waste; 14 6 (2) stated that "the permitted off-
site [treatment, storage and disposal facility] selected for treatment
and disposal of NECDF waste streams would.. . ensure that the
facility is safely treating the hydrolysate in accordance with
applicable federal, state and local regulations;" 47 and (3) was
provided to the public for comment.148
Furthermore, there was testimony in the record that the Army
"believed Veolia had a public meeting regarding its intent to enter
into a contract with the Government to incinerate CVXH."14 9 Based
on this record, the court concluded that the Army properly applied the
appropriate NEPA regulatory scheme to its decision-making process
and was not unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious in its decision to
not supplement the Final EA and Final Finding of No Significant
Impact before it began shipments of CVXH to Veolia for
incineration.15 0 Accordingly, the court denied Plaintiffs' Motion for
Preliminary Injunction.'15
B. Analysis
Sierra Club v. Gates is a prototypical case in which the Plaintiffs-
members of an environmental justice community-became unwitting
144. Id. at 1132.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1133.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1136.
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victims in a struggle between law and justice. An analysis of the
black-letter administrative law underlying the District Court's
opinion is beyond the scope of this comment, which is principally an
exploration of the environmental justice issues raised by Sierra Club
v. Gates. For now, it is sufficient to state either (1) that NEPA
adequately promotes environmental justice, but was erroneously
applied by the Court to produce an environmentally unjust outcome;
or (2) that the Court correctly applied NEPA and the result was an
environmentally unjust outcome. Under this first explanation,
prospective plaintiffs should account for "environmental justice
vacuums" in preparation for litigation and develop concrete ex ante
and ex post strategies for combating environmental injustice. Under
the second explanation, NEPA should be reformed in several
important ways to adequately reflect environmental justice principles.
Which explanation is most likely? Several commentators have
already addressed whether NEPA is effective as a tool for addressing
environmental injustice. Unfortunately, their answer has been a
resounding, "Somewhat."' 5 2 Despite its more obvious limitations,
NEPA can be used to achieve environmental justice in several
important ways. First, NEPA's broad and flexible public
participation provisions empower environmental justice communities
by enabling them to provide input into the federal government's
decision-making process.' 5 3  As Stephen M. Johnson, Associate
Professor of Law at Mercer University School of Law, explains:
In many cases minority and low-income communities are
disparately impacted by government actions because the
communities do not have a voice in the decision-making
process, and the communities lack the influence or political
power of special interest groups that may support the
government action. Broad and flexible public participation
provisions, like those in NEPA, empower communities and
provide them with a voice in the decision-making
process. 154
152. See Stephen M. Johnson, NEPA and SEPA's in the Quest for Environmental
Justice, 30 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 565, 577-76, 604 (1997).
153. Id. at 572.
154. Id.
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Second, the NEPA review process is useful as an information-
gathering, educational and organizational tool.15 5 To illustrate, CEQ
regulations require federal agencies to make available to the public
all relevant NEPA documents, together with any public or agency
comments the Army received on these documents.156 Recipients of
these documents:
(1) are alerted early on if the federal agency fails to recognize
the significance of certain facts under review;
(2) have the opportunity to convey to the agency its level of
opposition to, or concern over federal agency action; and
(3) possess a focal point around which community organizers
can galvanize public support.
Finally, NEPA advances environmental justice by ensuring that
administrative agencies consider socio-economic and health effects 5 7
and by delaying government actions that may disparately impact
environmental justice communities.158  Although NEPA's
unequivocal intent is not just to file detailed impact studies which
will fill governmental archives and add weight to court's files,
completed EISs are almost always detailed impact studies that fill
governmental archives and add weight to court's files. In other
words, NEPA compliance is costly and time-consuming.1 59 And it
provides communities with valuable time to organize and gather
information about a proposed action's potentially adverse impacts.' 60
It is important to consider that NEPA would not remedy past
injustices. Nor would NEPA guarantee for environmental justice
communities a favorable, or even a fair outcome.161 However, NEPA
has the potential to make government decision-making more
accountable, thereby ensuring for the public that government
decisions are democratically legitimate. While these provisions, in
155. See id.
156. Id. at 577.
157. Id. at 579.
158. Id. at 578.
159. See id. at 579.
160. Id.
161. This is because NEPA requires only environmentally informed decision-
making and not environmentally sound outcomes.
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theory, could be used to achieve environmental justice, NEPA is
subject to several practical and legal constraints that vastly limit its
effectiveness.' 62
First, if it is the case that NEPA adequately promotes
environmental justice, but was erroneously applied in Sierra Club v.
Gates to produce an environmentally unjust outcome, prospective
plaintiffs must account for "environmental justice vacuums" in
preparation for litigation. Additionally, they should develop concrete
ex ante and ex post strategies for combating environmental injustice.
I use the term "environmental justice vacuums" to refer to all legal
outcomes where statutory procedures exist to combat environmental
injustice, but are not utilized due to indifference, invidious intent, or
other practical difficulties. Perhaps the strongest environmental
justice vacuums occur when Courts permit agency practice to stultify
NEPA's broad and flexible public participation provisions. For
example, NEPA review documents are often released in highly
technical forms, containing complex scientific or technical data that
is not written in plain language.163 Courts that sanction this practice
make it necessary for environmental justice communities to hire
technical consultants and lawyers merely to translate the
documents,164 who often require large fees. Furthermore, even
documents written in plain English may be inaccessible to a
community impacted by the action addressed, if the impacted
community does not speak English as a primary, or even secondary
language. In response, courts should interpret NEPA to require that
decision-makers translate relevant materials, if a proposed action
would impact a community in which a significant percentage of the
members do not speak English.165 Finally, courts effectively exclude
members of the public from meaningful participation when they
allow federal agencies to hold public meetings and hearings during
normal work hours, or in locations that are inaccessible to community
members via public transportation.166 As I will argue, environmental
162. Johnson, supra note 152, at 588.
163. Reich, supra note 13, at 277-78 (citing Paul Mohai, Black
Environmentalism, 71 Soc. SCI. Q. 744, 762 (1990))(examining the barrier against
meaningful public participation created by the technical nature of environmental
policy discussions).
164. Johnson, supra note 152, at 601.
165. Id. at 602-03.
166. Id. at 603.
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justice advocates can prevent these vacuums by developing ex ante
and ex post strategies for dealing with environmental injustice.
Ex ante strategies refer to series of actions environmental justice
communities can take before concrete injury, or before a violation of
legal rights has occurred. Such strategies for dealing with
environmental injustice can reduce the impact of, or even the
likelihood that environmental injustice will occur, by enabling
environmental justice communities to speak for themselves. Such
strategies include grassroots organizing, lobbying federal agencies to
adopt public community-benefits agreements, encouraging
environmental and civic education, and establishing "watchdog"-
style news reporting-all of which can (and do) take place on the
community level. Organizers can also build coalitions with like-
minded non-profit organizations, or else local institutions that share
the community's outcome preferences without sharing its underlying
values. This increases access to ex post strategies for dealing with
environmental injustice, when cash and legal expertise are scarce.
Prospective plaintiffs should also petition federal agencies, like the
U.S. Army, to undertake new rulemaking procedures when a
proposed agency action would disparately impact an environmental
justice community. Although in the vast majority of cases, the
agency undertakes rulemaking because of a statutory command
compelling the rulemaking, or because of internal agency
determinations that a rulemaking is appropriate under one of the
agency's statutory authorizations, internal agency deliberations are
routinely influenced by outside individuals.167 For example, private
or "public interest" groups frequently lobby agencies to adopt rules
they desire, using procedures tailored to their interests.' 68 Of course,
an agency that has not shown any interest in adopting or amending a
rule before receiving a petition for rulemaking is unlikely to change
its mind merely because someone has petitioned it. Nevertheless,
another section of the APA has been interpreted as requiring an
167. The Administrative Procedure Act provides that administrative agencies
must give interested persons the right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or
repeal of a rule. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (1966). Some agencies have promulgated
procedural rules for the presentation of such petitions. Laminators Safety Glass
Ass'n v. Consumer Product Safety Commission, 578 F.2d 406 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
168. The Administrative Procedure Act also permits organizations representing
the concerns of their members to file rule-making petitions. Flint Ridge
Development Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Oklahoma, 426 U.S. 776 (1976).
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agency to respond to petitions in a timely fashion. 169 Afterwards, if
the agency rejects the petition, that rejection is judicially
reviewable.170
Finally, prospective plaintiffs should acknowledge that courts, and
other government actors to which they address their concerns,
frequently misunderstand the nature of "injury" in environmental
justice claims. They should therefore make explicit that
environmental justice requires meaningful participation, in addition
to equal distribution of environmental benefits and burdens within
society. In Sierra Club v. Gates, the District Court treated Plaintiffs'
NEPA and environmental justice claims as though Plaintiffs were
principally concerned with the effect of CVXH incineration on the
quality of human health and the environment. While this was a
significant issue, Port Arthur residents were also injured the very
instant that the Army committed itself to a course of action without
first consulting the public-precisely the type of injury that NEPA
hopes to avoid.172  Although Plaintiffs articulated claims of
inadequate public participation, it would have been to Plaintiffs'
advantage to make explicit that the relief they requested included the
"irreparable" injury of being excluded from the decision-making
process at the time their inclusion was morally required. This would
have made it eminently more difficult for the court to summarily
dispatch with the remaining factors in the test for a preliminary
injunction, in the event it determined that Plaintiffs could show a
likelihood of success on the merits. 173
169. 5 U.S.C. § 553(e).
170. This is another element the expected effect of which is to ensure that agency
actions are not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise
democratically illegitimate. As a general principle, when agencies act under the
shadow of judicial review, they are more likely to take precautions in excess of
those that are statutorily prescribed, or come to more facially reasonable decisions.
171. Sierra Club v. Gates, 499 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1126-27 (S.D. Ind. 2007).
172. See supra Part II.C.
173. Of course, this would not free plaintiffs from Chief Judge McKinney's
observation that, other than expert testimony that "the area adjacent to the Veolia
facility is the relatively affluent community of Taylor Landing, the Court has no
information from which to conclude that these concerns were not adequately
addressed by the [Environmental Protection Agency] and the [Veolia's Clean Air
Act] during the repermitting process in 2004." Sierra Club, 499 F. Supp. 2d at
1135-36. This statement is logically infirm for the principal reason that no
reasonable person could expect a community to meaningfully participate in a
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Second, if instead it is the case that the District Court correctly
applied NEPA to produce an environmentally unjust outcome, NEPA
should be reformed in several important ways to adequately reflect
environmental justice principles.
For example, a revised NEPA should ensure that federal agencies
use formal procedures' 74 to address potential impacts of proposed
agency actions in environmental justice communities. This would
ensure the informed and meaningful public participation that
environmental justice requires. Under applicable administrative law
statutes, a federal agency can in one rulemaking proceeding can
eliminate the need to consider an issue in all subsequent cases.175
This saves time and resources that might be used in multiple
adjudications of the issue and promotes consistent resolution of
questions likely to be repeated.176 However, these advantages come
at the price of the lack of individuated consideration necessary to
achieve environmental justice. As previously mentioned,
environmental justice requires (1) the equal distribution of
environmental benefits and burdens within society; and (2) that
environmental justice communities speak for themselves.177  In
theory, using informal rulemaking procedures to eliminate the need to
consider an issue in all subsequent cases could ensure that
environmental benefits and burdens are equally distributed within
decision-making process they did not have reason to know was occurring. As
previously noted, the Army first disclosed in the public portion of the
administrative record that it planned to incinerate CVXH in Port Arthur, Texas in
2007. This was a full three years after Veolia Environmental Services Inc. went up
for re-permitting.
174. Similar to the procedures set forth in §§ 556 and 557 of the APA. 5 U.S.C.
§§ 556-57.
175. See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435
U.S. 519 (1978) (upholding Nuclear Regulatory Commission's rulemaking
proceedings that would specifically deal with the question of consideration of
environmental effects associated with the uranium fuel cycle in the individual cost-
benefit analyses for light water cooled nuclear power reactors).
176. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE, §2.12
The Choice Between Adjudication and Rulemaking, 1 Admin. L. & Prac. § 2.12 (2d
ed.) (discussing the efficiency and fairness advantages of rulemaking in the
development of public policy) (come back and find out what this is considered);
David Shapiro, The Choice of Rulemaking or Adjudication in the Development of
Administrative Policy, 78 HARV. L. REv. 921 (1965)(forcefully arguing in favor of
rulemaking over adjudication in the development of public policy).
177. See supra notes 10, 12.
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society. However, using informal rulemaking procedures to
eliminate the need to consider an issue in all subsequent cases almost
never satisfies the environmental justice tenet that communities speak
for themselves. In other words, environmental justice demands
public participation in excess of informal rulemaking procedures,
unless every individual, in every community likely to be affected by a
prospective agency action has notice of and the opportunity to
participate in notice-and-comment rulemaking. To the extent this is
impractical, formal adjudication and formal rulemaking should take
statutory preference over informal adjudication and informal
rulemaking.
NEPA should also be amended to impose substantive requirements
on federal agency action. In its current form, NEPA requires federal
agencies to consider the effects of their actions, but does not prohibit
the government from taking actions that have adverse environmental,
socioeconomic, cultural or health impacts. As Professor William
Rodgers has noted, "[p]rocess, without more, is fundamentally a
toothless exercise, committed only to the perfection of forms." 79
Accordingly, Congress should craft changes to NEPA that would
specifically prohibit the federal government from taking an action
that "significantly affects the human environment," if there is a
practicable alternative that has less adverse impacts on the human
environment. so Failing this, NEPA should be amended to require
meaningful public participation earlier in the decision-making
process.
Finally, NEPA reform should address the how private actions fit
within the NEPA framework, and clarify the circumstances under
which an alternative government decision-making processes are the
functional equivalent of the NEPA process. As a result, many of the
actions that fall outside of the NEPA process today, and which may
disparately impact environmental justice communities in the future,
would be subject to NEPA's EIS or EA requirements.
178. Sierra Club-Black Hills Group v. United States Forest Serv., 259 F.3d 1281,
1287 (10th Cir. 2001).
179. William H. Rodgers, Jr., NEPA at Twenty: Mimicry and Recruitment in
Environmental Law, 20 ENVTL. L. 485, 494 (1990).
180. Johnson, supra note 152, at 599.
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